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Abstract
We study multi-district legislative elections between two office-seeking parties when the
election pits a relatively strong party against a weaker party; when each party faces uncertainty
about how voter preferences will evolve during the campaign; and, when each party cares
not only about winning a majority, but also about its share of seats in the event that it holds
majority or minority status. When the initial imbalance favoring one party is small, each party
targets the median voter in the median district, in pursuit of a majority. When the imbalance
is moderate, the advantaged party continues to hold the centre-ground, but the disadvantaged
party retreats to target its core supporters; it does so to fortify its minority share of seats in
the likely event that it fails to secure a majority. Finally, when the imbalance is large, the
advantaged party advances toward its opponent, raiding its moderate supporters in pursuit of
an outsized majority.
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1. Introduction
A near-axiomatic logic of two-party elections is that to win the contest, a party must carry the
support of the median voter. To the extent that political parties care solely about winning the
election, their platforms should therefore converge to the median voter’s most-preferred policy
(e.g., Hotelling 1929, Downs 1957). In legislative elections, however, winning is not everything. In
fact, winning a majority of legislative seats may be neither necessary nor sufficient for a party to
achieve its goals.
Two examples help illustrate this point. In 1992, John Major’s Conservative party won a ma-
jority of seats in the House of Commons, and the largest number of votes of any party in British
electoral history. Nonetheless, Major’s overall majority fell from 102 to a mere 21 seats. Despite its
victory, Major’s government was persistently hampered by its small majority, which contributed
to its first legislative defeat just over one year later.
In 2017, by contrast, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour party failed to win a majority of seats. Nonethe-
less, the party advanced its minority seat share by 26 seats, and successfully denied the Conser-
vative party its previously-held parliamentary majority. Since the Conservatives had enjoyed a
20-point lead in the polls at the moment Theresa May called the election, the press concluded that,
despite its failure to achieve outright victory, Labour had triumphed—in particular, over expec-
tations of an electoral rout. The outcome was summarized by one commentator as “the sweetest
of defeats”, while Labour MP and campaign strategist John Trickett boasted that ”every lesson all
these politics professors ever learned has been proved wrong”.1
At the start of the 2017 election campaign, Theresa May enjoyed a 39 percentage point pop-
ularity advantage over Jeremy Corbyn.2 She opted for “an aggressive strategy, influenced by
her strong lead in the initial polls... parking her tank on Labour’s lawn in heartlands such as
the North East and the North West of England.”3 May devoted 61% of her campaign visits to
Labour-held constituencies, and courted moderate Labour supporters with policy proposals that
included a price cap on energy bills—a policy commitment that had featured in Labour’s 2015
election manifesto.4
1 “The Jeremy Corbyn factor”, BBC News, 9 June 2017.
2 YouGov, 18-19 April 2018.
3 “What Theresa May’s campaign stops tell us about her failed strategy”, The Telegraph, 13 June 2017.
4 In that election cycle, David Cameron ridiculed energy price caps as evidence of Ed Miliband’s desire to live in a
‘Marxist universe’. See “Tories accused of stealing Labour’s energy price cap promise”, The Guardian, 23 April, 2017.
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By contrast, Labour’s campaign opted for a defensive strategy, eschewing centrist voters in
favor of its core supporters. Jeremy Corbyn devoted 42% of his campaign visits to constituencies
that Labour had won in the previous 2015 election with a victory margin of more than 20 percent-
age points, and made only 5% of his visits to constituencies that Labour had won with less than
a 15 percentage point lead.5 The party opted for a radical manifesto that promised to national-
ize public utilities, abolish university tuition fees, and levy new taxes on firms with highly-paid
staff.6 To observers who believed that a more moderate platform would maximize Labour’s elec-
tion performance, the party’s strategy was “baffling”.7 Why, then, did it forego the centrist—or
even right-leaning—route that led Tony Blair’s party to a majority of 179 seats in 1997?
More broadly, we ask: under what circumstances does an office-seeking party in a legislative
election want to choose its electoral platform to target to its traditional supporters, rather than
centrist voters? If it targets its traditional supporters, should the opposing party try to maintain
its hold on the centre-ground, cater to its own base, or instead try to raid its opponent’s more mod-
erate supporters? And, how do the answers to these questions depend on parties’ expectations
about their popularity, the extent of voters’ partisan loyalties, and the relative marginal value that
a party derives from winning additional seats below, at or above the majority threshold?
Our Approach. To address these questions, we develop a model of two-party competition be-
tween office-motivated parties in a multi-district legislative election. For example, the election
could determine control of a legislative chamber such as the U.S. House of Representatives, or
the British House of Commons. One of the parties holds an initial net valence advantage—for
example, its leadership may perceived as more competent, its opponent may be dogged by scan-
dal or simply worn out by a long period of incumbency. After the parties simultaneously choose
platforms, an aggregate net valence payoff shock in favor of one party is realized, and every voter
in every district subsequently casts his or her ballot for one of the two parties.
We assume throughout that each party’s payoff depends solely on its share of districts, or seats
in the legislature. However, this does not imply that parties care solely about winning the elec-
tion. If a party wins more than half of the total districts (seats), it not only derives a large fixed
payoff from majority status, i.e., from winning the election, it also receives a strictly increasing
payoff from any additional seats that it wins beyond the majority threshold. The fixed office rent
5 “Analysis shows Theresa May spent half of campaign targeting Labour seats”, The Guardian, 8 June 2017.
6 “For the Many, Not the Few”, Labour 2017 Election Manifesto, https://goo.gl/GZaTbk.
7 “The baffling world of Labour’s election strategy”, The Spectator, 27 April 2017.
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reflects the value of majority status per se: in a parliamentary democracy, majority status confers
the right to form the government regardless of the size of a party’s majority. Even in presidential
systems, majority status grants a party control over crucial aspects of the legislative process, in-
cluding scheduling bills and staffing committees. However, additional seats beyond the majority
threshold are also valuable: they further insulate the majority party from the threat of confidence
votes in a parliamentary context, insure against defections of a few party members on key votes,
and mitigate the obstructionist legislative tactics that a minority party can employ.
If, instead, a party holds minority status, i.e., if its share of seats falls below one half, its payoff
nonetheless strictly increases in its share of seats. This reflects that a stronger minority receives
more committee positions, and can more effectively derail the majority party’s agenda by use of
parliamentary procedures that privilege a more numerous minority. Our key substantive assump-
tion is that, conditional on winning minority status, the minority party cares sufficiently about the
number of seats it holds. For example, more seats may secure a larger share of committee assign-
ments, and greater recourse to obstructionist tactics that require supermajorities to override. It
may also reflect non-institutional factors: winning any sized majority is sufficient to secure a re-
prieve for an embattled leader (e.g., John Major), but the strength of a losing performance may
be crucial for a party leader’s short-term survival (e.g., Jeremy Corbyn). In fact, members of Cor-
byn’s own party speculated that he was “trying to maximise the popular Labour vote to help
bolster his argument for staying on in the event of a defeat.”8
Results. We obtain a unique equilibrium, in pure strategies, for all levels of the initial popular-
ity imbalance between the parties. The equilibrium characterization can be indexed according to
whether the initial imbalance is small, moderate, or large.
If the advantage is small, both parties locate at the policy preferred by the median voter in the
median district. The reason is that—even with an imbalance—both parties remain competitive
for majority status, encouraging them to compete aggressively to win the election, outright. This
reflects that while winning isn’t everything, it certainly matters a lot.
If the advantage is moderate, the disadvantaged party assesses that its prospect of winning an
outright majority is distant enough that it no longer finds it worthwhile to single-mindedly pur-
sue outright victory. Instead, its strategy reverts to moving its policy platform away from the
median voter in the median district, and in the direction of its core supporters. This choice may
8 “General Election 2017: A tale of two campaigns.” BBC News, 15 May, 2017.
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seem paradoxical, since this shift in strategy renders the party’s prospects of winning even more
distant. Nonetheless, it also increases its anticipated share of seats in the relatively more likely
event that the election consigns the party to minority status. The reason is that the party raises
its attractiveness to its core supporters by differentiating itself ideologically from the advantaged
party. With further increases in imbalance, the disadvantaged party further retreats to its base, as
the prospect of losing the election rises.
By contrast, the advantaged party maintains its strategy of targeting its platform at the policy
preferred by the median voter in the median district. While it could chase the disadvantaged party
into its own ideological turf in order to push for an even larger share of districts, its advantage is
only moderate, and alienating centrist voters would risk its prospects of majority status —a cost
that is high relative to the prospective gains from bolstering its seat share in the event that it wins.
Finally, if the imbalance is large, the disadvantaged party continues its retreat by locating its
platform even further from the centre and toward its core supporters. But now the advantaged
party gives chase, moving its platform beyond the median voter in the median district and into the
disadvantaged party’s ideological territory. This is strategically appealing for three reasons. First,
the party’s very strong advantage makes it less concerned about the risk of losing the election—
i.e., failing to win a majority of seats; instead, its focus shifts to generating a comfortable seat
advantage conditional on winning majority status. Second, it reduces the policy wedge between the
parties, which heightens the salience of the advantaged party’s net valence advantage, raising its
appeal amongst all voters. Third, it capitalizes on the opportunity created by the disadvantaged
party’s increasingly extreme lurch to raid its more moderate supporters.
While platforms fully converge when initial imbalances are small, we show how changes in
political primitives in the context of either a moderate or large initial imbalance either exacerbate
or mitigate the disadvantaged party’s incentive to revert to its base, and platform polarization.
When the initial imbalance is moderate, the disadvantaged party increasingly retreats to its
base whenever its initial disadvantage grows, whenever the marginal value of seats conditional
on minority status rises, or whenever uncertainty about voter preferences increases. It also further
retreats when there is a decline in the strength of partisan loyalty amongst its traditional support-
ers, since these voters are less easily taken for granted. Because the advantaged party maintains
its position in the centre, these changes thus trigger increased platform polarization.
Once the imbalance is large enough, however, further increases in the popularity imbalance
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induce both parties to move toward the disadvantaged party’s core supporters. And, in contrast
with moderate imbalances, the distance between platforms falls, reducing platform polarization.
Thus, our model predicts that platform divergence is maximized when the initial electoral imbal-
ance is neither very small, nor very large, and especially where partisan loyalties are in flux.
Contribution. Our premise and results contrast starkly with existing models of party positioning
in elections. In the framework developed by Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983), policy-motivated
parties face uncertainty about the preferences of the electorate—specifically, the median voter’s
most preferred platform. In equilibrium, if a party becomes more advantaged, i.e., the expected
location of the median voter moves toward its most-preferred policy, both parties advance toward
the advantaged party’s ideal policy.
Our framework predicts the opposite; consistent with the campaigns of Tony Blair and Theresa
May, when the advantaged party’s net valence advantage is large enough, an increased electoral
imbalance encourages both parties to move in the direction of disadvantaged party’s base. The ad-
vantaged party invades its opponent’s ideological turf in pursuit of a strong majority, while the
disadvantaged party retreats to its base in an attempt to rally its core supporters. The first impli-
cation seems eminently suited to interpreting Tony Blair’s electoral strategy in 1997 to transition
his party to New Labour, at a time when the party enjoyed a clear preference advantage amongst
British voters. This advantage was so strong that even The Sun newspaper, which had supported
the Conservatives in every election in the previous twenty years, endorsed Labour, condemn-
ing the Conservatives as “tired, divided and rudderless”.9 Our prediction also more accurately
characterizes Theresa May’s efforts to win over moderate Labour supporters in 2017. The second
implication more closely corresponds to Bogdanor’s summary of the Conservative lurch to the
right from 2001 to 2010, in which “three successive Conservative leaders... responded to defeat by
seeking to mobilize the Tory ‘core’ vote”.10
While our analysis focuses on legislative elections, our finding that an advantaged party
advances on its weaker opponent—rather than catering to its own core voters—extends to the
candidate-centered elections that are the focus of the Calvert-Wittman framework. Like both Bill
Clinton and Tony Blair, Emanuel Macron—at one time a Socialist party minister—leveraged his
large popularity advantage in his 2017 presidential campaign to adopt a ‘Third Way’ manifesto
that included reductions in corporate taxes and public spending, increased defense spending,
9 See Butler and Kavanagh (1997).
10 “The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron”, New Statesman.
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and allowing firms to negotiate additional working hours beyond the country’s 35-hour work
week.
Groseclose (2001) augments the Calvert-Wittman framework by introducing a deterministic
valence advantage for one party. However, Groseclose does not establish existence or uniqueness
of an equilibrium. Moreover, his main theoretical results are limited to a context with a small
valence advantage (specifically, moving from no advantage to an arbitrarily small advantage),
and his framework features a single (median) voter—precluding the question of whom to target
that drives our framework. The predictions that he derives when an equilibrium exists differ
substantially from our office-motivated context. For example, his framework predicts that an
increase in the advantaged party’s net valence advantage always raises platform differentiation;
and, if the advantaged party’s net valence advantage is very large, it always adopts more extreme
policy positions in the direction of its ideal policy.
Our framework predicts the opposite: the advantaged candidate responds to a large advan-
tage not by adopting more extreme positions favored by its own core supporters, but instead by
targeting its opponent’s moderate supporters. Our analysis reconciles campaigning by the Aus-
tralian Labor Party (ALP) during the first of several election victories, in 1983. The election came
at a time of high unemployment, high inflation, industrial unrest and a prime minister (Mal-
colm Fraser) who had only recently survived an internal leadership challenge. The incumbent
government was so unpopular that former ALP leader Bill Hayden quipped that “a drover’s dog
could lead the Labor Party to victory, the way the country is and the way the opinion polls are showing
up...”.11 During the election and in government, the party—whose constitution still declares it
to have “the objective of the democratic socialization of industry, production, distribution and
exchange”—promoted tariff reductions, tax reforms, limits on union activity, transitioning from
centralized bargaining to enterprise bargaining, the privatization of government enterprises, and
banking deregulation.
Also in contrast with Groseclose (2001), we find that policy divergence is maximized by an
intermediate electoral imbalance in favor of one party. If the imbalance is very small, both parties
compete for the support of the median voter in the median district, resulting in complete policy
convergence; and if the imbalance is large, the advantaged party chases the disadvantaged party
into its own turf, reducing policy divergence. When the imbalance is intermediate, the disadvan-
11 “Statements from Hayden Bowen, Hawke”. The Canberra Times, 4 February 1983.
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taged party retreats to its base, but the advantaged party maintains the centre-ground. Finally, we
prove existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium for all levels of the valence advantage.
Aragones and Palfrey (2002) and Hummel (2010) characterize equilibria in a Downsian setup
with purely office-motivated candidates and a deterministic net valence advantage. As in our
setting, the advantaged candidate benefits by raising the salience of this valence advantage. This
encourages the advantaged candidate to mimic the disadvantaged candidate, and the disadvan-
taged candidate to try to differentiate itself from the advantaged party. Both papers are limited
to characterizing a particular mixed strategy equilibrium, under the restriction either of a small
(Aragones and Palfrey, 2002) or large ( Hummel, 2010) initial valence advantage.12
Our framework offers an explanation for why parties may instrumentally choose relatively
extreme policies. In Eguia and Giovannoni (Forthcoming), a party that is sufficiently disadvan-
taged today may give up on a mainstream policy, and instead invest in an extreme policy; it does
so not to increase its office-motivated payoffs today, but instead to gamble on a shock to voters’
preferences in a subsequent election. Our explanation emphasizes that the instrumental adoption
of extreme policies in the face of a likely election defeat arises not only via dynamic office-holding
incentives, but also via static office-holding incentives that emphasize the value of a strong mi-
nority position.
Our multi-district framework is closest to Callander (2005), in which two parties simultane-
ously choose national platforms, facing entry by local candidates, generating equilibrium plat-
forms that differ greatly from ours. Other authors—for example, Austen-Smith (1984), Kittsteiner
and Eyster (2007), and Krasa and Polborn (2018)—study multi-district competition in which party
platforms are an aggregate of decentralized choices by local candidates. Our framework, like
Callander’s, instead reflects a context in which voters predominantly assess their view of the
party on the basis of its national platform.13
12 Aragones and Palfrey (2005) endow candidates with private information about their preferences, obtaining a
pure strategy equilibrium. As the relative weights placed by each candidate on policy outcomes as opposed to office
rents converge to zero, the distribution over candidates’ policies approaches the mixed strategy equilibrium obtained
in Aragones and Palfrey (2002).
13 In Polborn and Snyder (2017), each party’s platform is assumed to reflect the preferences of its median elected
legislative candidate. In contrast to our approach, it is therefore determined after the election—in particular, after
net valence shocks are realized.
7
2. Model
Preliminaries. Two parties, L andR, simultaneously choose campaign platforms, zL and zR, prior
to an election. The policy space is the one-dimensional continuum, R. Competition involves mul-
tiple districts, with the winner of each individual district determined by a plurality rule. Each
district features a continuum of voters, and each voter i is indexed by his or her preferred policy,
xi. There are a continuum of districts: each district is indexed by its median voter’s preferred
policy m, and district medians are uniformly distributed on the interval [−1, 1].14
Voter Payoffs. If party L implements platform zL, a voter iwith preferred policy xi derives payoff
u(i, zL) = −γ|zL − xi| − θxi/2. (1)
If, instead, party R implements its platform zR, the voter derives the payoff
u(i, zR) = −γ|zR − xi|+ θxi/2 + ρ0 + ρ1. (2)
Here, ρ0 is an initial valence advantage in favor of party R, commonly known by all agents, and
ρ1 is a preference shock, uniformly distributed on the interval [−ψ, ψ].15 The valence advantage ρ0
reflects voters’ relative assessment of the parties at the outset of a campaign—for example, evalu-
ations of its leadership that are inherited from a party’s previous spell in government. The valence
shock ρ1, by contrast, summarizes unanticipated developments that unfold over the course of an
election campaign— right up to election day—including performances by party leaders in public
debates or town hall meetings, or scandal revelations. If the legislative election coincides with
a presidential election, ρ1 could also capture evaluations of a party arising from its presidential
candidate’s campaign. Without loss of generality, we assume ρ0 ≥ 0.
The policy-related part of voters’ preferences has two distinct components. The first compo-
nent is a linear policy loss that increases with the distance between the party’s policy platform
and the voter’s preferred policy. The parameter γ can be interpreted as the salience of the pol-
icy dimension on which parties choose platforms, or alternatively it could reflect the perceived
credibility of the candidates’ pre-electoral policy commitments.
14 Under Assumption 2, below, the distribution of voters’ ideal policies within each district plays no role in our
analysis, beyond the location of the median voter’s ideal policy in that district.
15 One could alternatively interpret ρ0 as the mean of the preference shock ρ1, i.e., ρ1 ∼ U [ρ0 − ψ, ρ0 + ψ].
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The second component, which implies that voter i derives an additional net value −θxi from
party L, has multiple interpretations. For example, it could reflect a fixed policy position on an-
other dimension of policy conflict, e.g., social issues such as abortion, gay marriage, or on trade
and immigration, and voter preferences on this issue are correlated with their preferences on
taxation—over which parties are proposing policies—where the extent to which voters care about
this second issue is proportional to θ.
Our running interpretation is that it reflects partisanship, i.e., a voter’s “early-socialized, en-
during, affective... identification with a specific political party” (Dalton, 2016, 1) that transcends
short-term policy platforms that parties adopt from one election to the next. For example, while
the British Labour Party has vacillated between centrism and more left-wing policies many times
in the twentieth century, its loyalty amongst its core voters in the north of England has remained
firm. In the United States, southern support for the Republican party is robust to changes in the
party’s platform across elections.
In sum, a voter with preferred policy xi prefers party L if and only if:
∆(xi) ≡ γ|zR − xi| − γ|zL − xi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Platform gap
− θxi︸︷︷︸
Partisan gap
− (ρ0 + ρ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Valence gap
≥ 0.
Party Payoffs. Let dP ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of districts won by party P ∈ {L,R}, and let
MP = I[dP > 1/2] denote the event that party P wins a majority of districts. Party P ’s payoff is
uP (dP ) = MP [r + β(dP − 1/2)] + (1−MP )αdP . (3)
A party receives a fixed payoff of r > 0 if it wins the election, i.e., if dP > 1/2. Higher val-
ues of r reflect the majoritarian organization of a legislature: winning a majority gives a party
agenda-setting authority, and control over committee assignments and leadership. And, in a par-
liamentary democracy, winning a majority yields formal control over the executive branch.
Parties also value winning additional seats both below and above the majoritarian threshold.
Even if a party fails to achieve a majority, i.e., dP < 1/2, it still gains from winning more seats. And,
if a party achieves a majority, it values increasing its share of seats above the majority threshold.
To capture this idea in the simplest possible way, we let α > 0 denote the marginal value of win-
ning districts that nonetheless keep a party’s total share of districts less than a majority; similarly,
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β > 0 denotes the marginal value of winning districts above and beyond the majority threshold
of one half. This piece-wise linear formulation facilitates tractable solutions, and may be viewed
as an approximation of more sophisticated payoff schedules.
We impose two assumptions; the first assumption focuses on party preferences, while the sec-
ond assumption focuses on voter preferences.
Assumption 1: r > 1
2
(
α + ψ
θ
(α− β)), and α ≥ β.
The first restriction states that parties sufficiently value winning majority status. Notice that for
majority status to convey a benefit, it must be that r > α/2.16
The second preference restriction, α ≥ β states that the marginal value of additional seats to
a minority party exceeds the marginal value of additional seats to a majority party, above and
beyond its gains from majority status that are captured by r. We later describe properties of equi-
librium policy platforms under the alternative assumption that β > α; nonetheless, we view the
restriction in Assumption 1 as inherently more plausible. For example, one can view α > β as a
reduced-form preference assumption that captures the value of extra seats to the majority party
when it obtains additional leeway to move policy outcomes closer to its most-preferred goal.
Then, a larger majority allows the majority party to shift policy in its preferred direction. If party
leaders have concave utility over policy, these incremental policy movements harm the minority
party by more than they benefit the majority party, implying that α > β.17
Assumption 2: θ > 2γ.
This assumption eases analysis by ensuring that for any pair of platforms, there is some ideal
policy x∗ such that a voter prefers party L if and only if her ideal policy lies to the left of x∗.18 This
implies that in any district, the median voter is decisive for the outcome of that district’s election.
It further implies that the median voter in the median district determines which party wins the
16 The restriction on r is not needed for our qualitative results. We make it to streamline exposition; moreover, we
view it as a reasonable description of real-world contexts, in which the value of achieving majority status per se is
large relative both to the value of minority status and relative to any incremental gains from an ever-larger share of
seats beyond the majority threshold.
17 We thank Pablo Montagnes for this observation. Alternatively, the reduced-form preference assumption could
reflect a party leader’s calculation about how the election outcome will affect her risk of being replaced. While
an embattled leader who wins an election may secure a reprieve from the threat of replacement, regardless of her
margin of victory, her survival if she loses an election may depend very sensitively on just how badly she loses.
18 In particular, Assumption 2 implies that this is true even if the parties adopt platforms satisfying zR < zL.
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national election.19
Timing. The interaction proceeds as follows.
1. The parties simultaneously select platforms zL and zR.
2. The preference shock ρ1 is realized and observed by all agents.
3. Each voter chooses to vote for one of the two parties.
4. The party that wins a majority of districts implements its promised platform, and payoffs
are realized.
Discussion. In our framework, parties know voters’ policy preferences, but they face uncertainty
about whether a popularity advantage at the start of the campaign (ρ0) will subsequently in-
crease, narrow, or even reverse during the election (via ρ1). Both Aragones and Palfrey (2002)
and Groseclose (2001) adopt the opposite perspective that at the time parties choose platforms,
they perfectly forecast their relative popularity on election day, but face uncertainty about voters’
policy preferences—specifically, the median voter’s preferred policy.
Our approach reflects the view that an individual’s perceptions of a party or party leader’s
competence, honesty and charisma—arising from campaign rallies, public debates and town
halls, and (social) media coverage—fluctuate much more over the course of a single election cycle
than his or her views on policy issues such as taxation, health care or gay marriage. They there-
fore constitute the first-order source of uncertainty facing parties in a given election. For example,
while Theresa May started the 2017 election with a 39 percentage point popularity advantage, her
popularity fluctuated throughout the campaign, and by polling day her margin had diminished to
10 percentage points.20 In addition to its substantive motivation, our modeling framework yields
a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, facilitating our goal of describing strategic behavior in
real-world election campaigns.
3. Results
Preliminary Results. We begin by identifying the share of districts won by each party for any
platform pair (zL, zR) and net valence advantage ρ0 + ρ1—and thus each party’s probability of
19 For tractability, we also assume that ψ is large enough that each party wins with positive probability in all
districts, for any platform pair (zL, zR) ∈ [−1, 1]2.
20 “Opinion Polling for the United Kingdom General Election, 2017”, https://goo.gl/7mTYQW.
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winning the election. Under Assumption 2, preferences are single-peaked, so there is a unique
voter that is indifferent between the candidates: there is some ideal policy x∗i (zL, zR, ρ0 + ρ1) such
that a voter prefers party L if and only if her ideal policy lies to the left of x∗i . This implies that
party L wins a district with median m if and only if x∗i ≥ m. Because district medians are uni-
formly distributed on [−1, 1], party L’s share of districts is therefore
1 + x∗i (zL, zR, ρ0 + ρ1)
2
.
Party L therefore wins the election if and only if x∗i ≥ 0, i.e., if and only if it is preferred by the
median voter in the median district, with ideal policy zero. We have:
x∗i ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ|zR| − γ|zL| − ρ0 ≥ ρ1 ≡ ρ∗1(zL, zR, ρ0).
Henceforth, we call the median voter in the median district the median voter. Substituting into the
party payoff function in equation (3) yields party L’s expected payoff:
piL(zL, zR) =
∫ ρ∗1(zL,zR,ρ0)
−ψ
(
r + β
(
1 + x∗i (zL, zR, ρ0 + ρ1)
2
− 1
2
))
f(ρ1)dρ1
+
∫ ψ
ρ∗1(zL,zR,ρ0)
α
(
1
2
+
x∗i (zL, zR, ρ0 + ρ1)
2
)
f(ρ1)dρ1. (4)
Party R’s corresponding expected payoff is:
piR(zL, zR) =
∫ ψ
ρ∗1(zL,zR,ρ0)
(
r + β
(
1− x∗i (zL, zR, ρ0 + ρ1)
2
− 1
2
))
f(ρ1)dρ1
+
∫ ρ∗1(zL,zR,ρ0)
−ψ
α
(
1
2
− x
∗
i (zL, zR, ρ0 + ρ1)
2
)
f(ρ1)dρ1. (5)
Main Results. We now characterize equilibrium platforms choices and highlight how they de-
pend on R’s initial advantage (ρ0), uncertainty about how preferences will evolve over the course
of the election (i.e., uncertainty about ρ1), the relative value of seats to the minority party (α) ver-
sus the majority (β), and the value of winning a legislative majority (r). We first establish that our
framework produces a unique equilibrium, in pure strategies.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium.
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To understand why—and to preview the incentives that govern equilibrium platform choices—
we consider a platform pair (zL, zR) satisfying zL < zR = 0 and study the local incentives of party
L. Recall that there exists a unique voter that is indifferent between the two parties, whose pre-
ferred platform x∗ satisfies:
∆(x∗) = γ|zR − x∗| − γ|zL − x∗| − θx∗ − ρ0 − ρ1 = 0,
such that a voter prefers party L if and only if her ideal policy lies to the left of x∗. We refer to this
indifferent agent as the marginal voter. Notice that there are three possible intervals from which
the marginal voter’s preferred policy could be realized, depending on the sign and magnitude of
the valence shock ρ1. These correspond to the three intervals highlighted in Figure 1, in which we
identify thresholds ρ
1
and ρ1 such that:
1. if ρ1 < ρ1, the marginal voter belongs to one of advantaged party R’s core districts:
x∗1 =
γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≥ zR. (6)
2. If ρ1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ1, the marginal voter belongs to a moderate district:
x∗2 =
γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2γ + θ
∈ [zL, zR]. (7)
3. If ρ1 > ρ1, the marginal voter belongs to one of disadvantaged party L’s relatively extreme
core districts:
x∗3 =
γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≤ zL. (8)
Notice that the marginal voter’s ideal policy lies to the right of zero if and only if ρ1 ≤ ρ1, in which
case party L wins the election.21
We may therefore re-write equation (4), party L’s expected payoff from a platform zL when
21 If θ = 0, the marginal voter’s preferred policy always lies on the interior [zL, zR]—for example, this carries the
implausible implication that either every voter with ideal policy to the left of zL supports party L, or every such voter
supports party R. When parties care about their seat share above (β > 0) or below (α > 0) a majority, θ = 0 generates
payoff discontinuities which result in mixed strategies.
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Figure 1 – Possible locations for the marginal voter (bottom row), depending on the valence
shock ρ1 (higher row).
party R chooses zR = 0:
piL(zL, zR) = r
∫
ρ1<ρ1
f(ρ1)dρ1 +
β
2
∫
ρ1<ρ1
x∗1(ρ1)f(ρ1) dρ1
+
α
2
∫
ρ
1
<ρ1<ρ1
x∗2(ρ1)f(ρ1) dρ1 +
α
2
∫
ρ1>ρ1
x∗3(ρ1)f(ρ1) dρ1 +
α
2
∫
ρ1>ρ1
f(ρ1)dρ1. (9)
This first term reflects that if the valence shock is sufficiently favorable to partyL, i.e., if ρ1 < ρ1,
then it wins a majority of votes, and thus enjoys the majority status payoff, r. The second term
captures the additional return that party L receives from winning any additional seats beyond the
majority threshold, which it values at a rate β ≥ 0. Finally, the bottom line reflects party L’s value
α ≥ 0 from winning seats when it holds minority status.
Suppose that party L moves to the left, and thus away from party R. After simplifying, we
obtain its change in payoffs:
∂piL(zL, 0)
∂(−zL) ∝
(
r − α
2
) ∂ρ
1
∂(−zL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
β
2
∫
ρ1<ρ1
∂x∗1(ρ1)
∂(−zL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dρ1
+
α
2
∫
ρ
1
≤ρ1≤ρ1
∂x∗2(ρ1)
∂(−zL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dρ1 +
α
2
∫
ρ1>ρ1
∂x∗3(ρ1)
∂(−zL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dρ1. (10)
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This expression highlights the two critical agents that determine L’s electoral trade-offs: the me-
dian voter, and the marginal voter.
Median voter. Party L faces an uncertain prospect of winning, because of the stochastic valence
shock ρ1. However, it does not face uncertainty about the policy that maximizes this prospect.
Moving away from the policy preferred by the median voter, with ideal policy zero, differentiates
party L from its stronger opponent. This increases L’s attractiveness to voters that already prefer
L’s policy to its moderate opponent’s policy. Nonetheless, it harms L’s standing with the voter
that is decisive for the election, who is now better served by party R. This harms L in proportion
to r, the value of majority status, reflected in the first term on the RHS of equation (10).
Marginal voter. While parties can forecast the policy preferences of the median voter, they nonethe-
less face uncertainty about the identity of the marginal voter. When L differentiates its platform
from R’s by moving to the left, the consequences depend critically on the whether the stochastic
valence shock ρ1 exacerbates, diminishes or even reverses party R’s initial valence advantage.
1. If the valence shock ρ1 strongly favors L, i.e., if ρ1 < ρ1, then the marginal voter prefers R’s
policy to L’s. Equation (6) highlights that L’s move toward its core supporters shifts the
marginal voter’s ideal policy x∗1 to the left. This lowers L’s incremental majority seat share,
which it values at a rate β. This loss is reflected in the second term on the RHS of equation
(10).
2. If the valence shock weakly favors party R, i.e., if ρ1 ∈ [ρ1, ρ1], then the marginal voter is a
relatively moderate agent with ideal policy i2 ∈ (zL, zR). Equation (7) reveals that L’s move
toward its core supporters shifts the marginal voter’s ideal policy x∗2 to the left. This lowers
L’s incremental minority seat share, which it values at a rate α. This harms L in proportion
to α, which is reflected in the third term on the RHS of equation (10).
3. If the valence shock strongly favorsR, i.e., if ρ1 < ρ1, then the marginal voter prefers L’s pol-
icy to R’s. Equation (8) reveals that L’s move toward its core supporters shifts the marginal
voter’s ideal policy x∗1 to the right. This raises L’s incremental minority seat share, which it
values at a rate α. This gain is reflected in the fourth term on the RHS of equation (10).
The relative strength of these incentives depends on the value of majority status (r), and the
relative value of additional minority (α) and majority (β) seats. It also depends on the magnitude
of the initial valence advantage that favors party R, ρ0: for any fixed pair of platforms, a higher ρ0
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lowers the prospect of a valence shock ρ1 < ρ1 that carries party L to victory and raises the prospect
of a valence shock ρ1 > ρ1, such that the marginal voter is drawn from one of L’s more extreme
core districts. In this latter case, L’s core vote becomes its swing vote!
If ρ1 > ρ1, then the valence shock sufficiently favors advantaged party R that the marginal
voter’s ideal policy lies to the left of its platform, i.e., zero. The party therefore wins a majority.
Moving its policy toward its weaker opponent (“chasing” party L) can help it to secure a larger
share of seats in this event. However, if ρ1 < ρ1, then the valence shock favors its opponent so
strongly that the marginal voter’s ideal policy lies to the right of party R’s platform. Party R is
therefore consigned to minority status. Moving its policy toward its weaker opponent only exac-
erbates its losses in this event, because the party further alienates its core supporters—who have
become swing voters due to the large valence shock that favors party L.
In sum: each party’s trade-offs depend on their beliefs about the likely location of the marginal
voter, and thus where the front lines of the electoral battle will be fought. This location depends
both on primitives and platform choices. How these trade-offs resolve, and thus the characteri-
zation of the unique equilibrium, can be indexed according to whether the advantaged party’s
initial imbalance is small, intermediate, or large.
Proposition 1. If party R’s advantage is small in the sense that
0 ≤ ρ0 ≤ θ(2r − α)− (α− β)ψ
α + β
≡ ρ
0
,
then both parties locate at the ideal policy of the median voter in the median district:
z∗L(ρ0) = 0, z
∗
R(ρ0) = 0.
A party wins a majority of districts if and only if it is most-preferred by the median voter in the
median district, i.e., with most-preferred policy zero. When the parties are initially balanced, i.e.,
when ρ0 is zero, each party is competitive for a majority. Because parties place a premium r on
majority status, each party aggressively pursues an outright victory.
Starting from a position of initial symmetry, i.e., starting from ρ0 = 0, increases in ρ0 reduce L’s
chances of winning, but do not alter the policy platform that maximizes this probability. Thus—
and to an extent that is proportional to its value from majority status, r—L’s electoral strategy
continues to target a legislative majority by way of a centrist policy platform even as its prospects
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of winning deteriorate. Notice that as (α− β)ψ increases—implying a greater relative concern for
incremental minority versus majority seat shares, α − β, combined with the greater electoral risk
encapsulated in ψ—the upper bound of imbalance for which the disadvantaged party wants to
compete directly with the advantaged party (ρ
0
) falls.
When the imbalance between the parties is large enough, however, L no longer prefers unmit-
igated competition with R for outright victory.
Proposition 2. If party R’s advantage is intermediate in the sense that
ρ
0
≤ ρ0 < ρ0 +
ψ(α− β)(2θα + (α− β)γ)
(α + β)(αθ + (α− β)γ) ≡ ρ0,
then party L retreats to its base,
z∗L(ρ0) =
θ(2r − α)− α(ρ0 + ψ) + β(ψ − ρ0)
γ(α− β) + 2αθ < 0,
but R still locates at the ideal policy of the median voter in the median district, choosing z∗R(ρ0) = 0.
When the electoral imbalance in favor of partyR surpasses an initial threshold ρ
0
> 0, two features
of the disadvantaged party L’s competitive environment shift enough to merit a change in elec-
toral strategy. First, a sufficiently high ρ0 implies that the prospect of winning a majority—even
when targeting the median voter, directly—becomes a distant prospect. Second, when zL = zR = 0,
equation (8) reveals that a large ρ0 implies that in the event L fails to win a majority, the marginal
voter with ideology x∗3 = −ρ0+ρ1θ is decisive in one of L’s core districts. This further implies that
(a) when L loses the election on a strategy designed to win outright, it loses very badly, and (b)
it can make the best of its likely opposition status only by buttressing its support amongst these
core districts.
As a result, L’s best electoral strategy reverts to galvanizing its base, i.e., by selecting a plat-
form zL(ρ0) < 0. By distancing itself from party R, it creates a meaningful ideological alternative
to R’s centrist platform: policy differentiation partly mitigates L’s valence disadvantage amongst
voters that value more left-wing policies. While retreating from the political centre further low-
ers L’s prospect of winning a majority of districts, ρ0 > ρ0 implies that party L no longer finds
it worthwhile to target an outright victory. That is, acknowledging that it is very likely to hold
minority status, its priority smoothly reverts from solely pursuing a majority to instead balancing
this objective with the need to secure the most advantageous minority share of seats possible.
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By contrast, the same primitives encourage party R to maintain its hold on the ideological
centre-ground. Its prospect of winning the election is maximized by selecting the policy preferred
by the median voter in the median district. Party R could chase L into its own ideological turf, in
order to increase its seat advantage conditional on holding a majority. However, its initial elec-
toral advantage is still small enough (ρ0 < ρ0) that it does not want to risk its prospect of winning.
Chasing disadvantaged party L makes advantaged party R more palatable to moderate left-wing
districts, but harms R’s standing with both the median voter and R’s own core voters. And, in the
event that R fails to win a majority, the marginal voter—with ideology x∗1 > 0—will indeed be one
of R’s core supporters. To the extent that R values insuring itself against an adverse popularity
shock, it prefers not to give chase.
To see this point, more clearly, notice that the size of the interval [ρ
0
, ρ0] is proportional to
ψ(α− β), and the interval is empty when α = β. This reflects the advantaged party’s incentive to
hold back versus give chase. As it advances on its retreating opponent by shifting its platform to
the left:
1. it raises its appeal amongst its opponent’s core supporters and therefore—conditional on
winning—raises its share of districts by shifting the marginal voter’s ideal policy x∗3 =
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−ρ1
θ
to the left (recall equation (8)). It values these districts at rate β; but,
2. it lowers its appeal amongst its own core supporters, and therefore—-conditional on losing—
lowers its share of districts by shifting the marginal voter’s ideal policy x∗1 =
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−ρ1
θ
to the right (recall equation (6)). It values these districts at rate α ≥ β.
As the wedge α−β increases—amplified by the magnitude of the election risk ψ—the advantaged
party increasingly prefers to ‘play it safe’, holding back even as its initial advantage increases.
These channels generate natural effects of primitives on party L’s platform, and thus the de-
gree of policy divergence between the parties.
Corollary 1. PartyL increasingly retreats to its base—and thus platform divergence increases—whenever
1. its initial disadvantage ρ0 increases,
2. the marginal value of minority seats α increases, or
3. uncertainty about voter preferences ψ rises.
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Conversely, L increasingly targets the median voter when
1. the value of majority status r increases,
2. party loyalty θ increases, or
3. policy responsiveness γ rises.
If party loyalty θ amongst more ideologically polarized voters rises, party L becomes less wor-
ried about losing support amongst its core districts—the rate at which higher valence shocks ρ1
shift the identity of the marginal voter further into its core districts slows. This encourages the
party to target more centrist districts whose support is crucial for the party to win. Conversely,
when voters are relatively more responsive to platform choices via γ, the weaker party must make
greater concessions to its base in order to win their support.
Finally, suppose that parties anticipate a more volatile electorate via higher ψ. Then, for any
pair of platforms, there is a heightened prospect of a large post-election imbalance between the
majority and minority party via more extreme realizations of ρ1 ∼ U [−ψ, ψ], because the marginal
voter’s identity becomes more volatile. If the disadvantaged party competes more aggressively
by moving its platform toward its opponent, it could win more seats in the event of a strong ma-
jority (i.e., ρ1 < ρ1), but it may lose more seats in the event of an unfavorable ρ1 > ρ1 realization
that consigns the party minority status. Here, with α > β, risk-aversion encourages the weaker
party to hasten its retreat. Thus, our framework predicts that platform polarization is greater
when party loyalty is weaker (θ smaller) and voters’ preferences are more volatile.
Finally, when the imbalance between the parties is very large, partyR becomes so emboldened
by its initial advantage over L that it abandons the mere pursuit of victory, and instead chases its
weaker opponent in an effort to plunder its moderate supporters.
Proposition 3. If party R’s advantage is large, i.e., ρ0 > ρ0, then party L retreats by more to its base:
z∗L(ρ0) =
((α− β)γ + βθ)(θ(2r − α)− (α + β)ρ0)− βθψ(α− β)
θ((α2 − β2)γ + 2αβθ) , (11)
and party R advances toward party L’s base:
z∗R(ρ0) = z
∗
L(ρ0) + (α− β)
(α + β)(ψ − ρ0) + θ(2r − α)
(α2 − β2)γ + 2αβθ . (12)
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When the electoral imbalance in favor of partyR is very large, party L overwhelmingly focuses on
consolidating support amongst its base—the most likely location of the marginal voter, and thus
the most likely front-line of the political battle. In turn, party R also advances into L’s ideological
territory to win over centre-left districts that are increasingly ill-served by the more extreme L
party. It does so for two reasons. First, a sufficiently large advantage (ρ0 > ρ0) makes party R
less concerned about its chances of achieving majority status and instead more focused on gen-
erating the largest possible legislative majority in the event that it wins. Second, by reducing the
policy differentiation between the parties, R intensifies its comparative valence advantage in the
eyes of the likely marginal voter, further increasing its support. Notice that as α − β → 0, the
platforms converge, i.e., z∗L(ρ0) = z
∗
R(ρ0), reflecting the chase-and-evade logic of Aragones and
Palfrey (2002).
Corollary 2 summarizes the effect of primitives on the parties’ platforms, and their conse-
quences for platform divergence.
Corollary 2. As R’s initial advantage ρ0 ≥ ρ0 increases, both party L and party R move toward L’s base,
and platform divergence decreases.
As partyL becomes further disadvantaged, it faces even greater incentives to target its base; by
differentiating itself further from the advantaged party, it increases its appeal to its core support-
ers, consolidating its minority position. However, party R is also further emboldened to advance
into its opponent’s home turf. Their incentives are two-fold; a higher ρ0 strengthensR’s incentives
to chase the increasingly weakened L and—independently—it wants to use its platform to turn
centrist districts that L has abandoned, in pursuit of an outsized majority. The net effect is that
platforms further converge, with the speed of convergence increasing in β, the marginal value of
seats conditional on majority status.
Corollary 2 highlights that party R’s platform moves to the left faster than party L’s, so that
the net effect is to reduce policy differentiation between the parties. Conversely, if ρ0 decreases,
both parties move their platforms toward the median voter in the median district, but party L
moves more slowly than party R, increasing the degree of platform divergence.
Other changes in primitives may lead to different effects for the ex-ante advantaged versus
disadvantaged party, and may hinge on other features of the political environment.
Corollary 3. When the marginal value of minority seats, α, increases, party L increasingly retreats to its
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base by an amount that increases in preference volatility, ψ. By contrast, when α increases, there exists
ρˆ0 ≥ ρ0 such that party R moves toward L’s base if and only its initial advantage ρ0 exceeds ρˆ0.
As α rises, party L grows more concerned about not losing the election too badly, so it increas-
ingly targets its core supporters. Party R, however, faces two conflicting incentives. First, as α
increases, it too has a stronger incentive to consolidate its core support by reverting to the right,
i.e., in the direction of its base. This incentive increases with preference volatility, ψ, since more
volatility implies a greater risk of a bad election result that consigns the party to minority status.
However, as party L increasingly moves toward its base, party R also faces a stronger incentive to
advance toward party L’s platform in order to reduce the policy differentiation between parties,
thereby heightening its comparative valence advantage.
The net effect on party R’s equilibrium platform depends on the size of its initial advantage.
If this initial advantage is low, party R’s unwillingness to abandon its core supporters is the dom-
inant force, encouraging it to move its platform back toward the median voter. If, instead, its
initial advantage is large enough, party R chases party L even more aggressively, in order to
reduce platform differentiation and further press its heightened advantage.
Corollary 4. As the value of majority status r increases, both party L and party R revert toward the ideal
policy of the median voter in the median district, but platform divergence increases.
A party wins a majority if and only if it is preferred by the median voter. A higher value r
of majority status encourages both parties to target this voter. Corollary 4 highlights that party
R’s platform moves faster than party L’s. To see why, recall that party L remains at a competitive
disadvantage; moving toward the centre raises its attractiveness to moderate voters, but dampens
its relative appeal amongst its base. This represents a trade-off for party L. For party R, however,
moving back toward the centre both raises its appeal to centrists and its core supporters.
Since both trade-offs are complementary to party R, but opposing for party L, the net effect
is to increase platform divergence: L reluctantly abandons its base, while R’s increased desire to
win implies that its platform choice is governed less by the incentive to chase L, and more by the
incentive to maximize its appeal to the decisive voter in a bid for outright victory.
Corollary 5. As electoral volatility ψ increases, both party L and party R revert toward their respective
core supporters, and platform divergence increases.
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When there is a large initial wedge in the parties’ initial strength, more uncertainty always
raises platform divergence. This reflects that both parties grow more concerned with insuring
themselves against an adverse popularity shock by consolidating their core supporters. Greater
volatility raises the prospect that the election will result in a larger imbalance in favor of one of
the two parties. Because α − β > 0, each risk-averse party resolves in favor of buttressing its seat
share in the event that it is consigned to minority status.
We highlight our framework’s predictions about the political contexts in which platform di-
vergence is maximized. Maximal platform divergence occurs when ρ0 = ρ0, i.e., when the initial
imbalance between the parties is large, but not overwhelming. Platform divergence also rises
when parties care substantially about bolstering the minority position (α large), when traditional
party loyalties are in flux (θ small) and when there is significant uncertainty about the mood of
the electorate, as reflected in uncertainty about ρ1 (i.e., ψ is large).
What about β > α? Our analysis focuses on settings where α ≥ β, i.e., where the marginal value
of additional seats to the minority exceeds the marginal value of additional seats to the majority
(β), above and beyond its per se benefit from majority status, r. In the less plausible context in
which β > α, the parties fully converge on the ideal policy of the median voter in the median
district when R’s advantage is not too large—as in our benchmark setting. As we detail in a Sup-
plemental Appendix, however, with a very large initial advantage, the shape of preferences may
induce parties to engage in risk-taking behavior, generating platform separation in which party R
gambles on a left-wing platform, leaving the centre-ground to its weaker opponent. Our bench-
mark presentation, by contrast, reflects the more empirically relevant scenario in which parties
may court their opponent’s core supporters (as detailed in Proposition 3), but never to the extent
that their own core voters are better served by their opponent.
4. Conclusion
We analyze two-party competition in multi-district legislative elections. We ask: how do initial
electoral imbalances encourage an office-seeking party to target its traditional supporters, rather
than the centrist voters that are crucial for outright victory? If it targets traditional supporters,
when should the opposing party maintain its focus on courting centrist voters, and when instead
should it chase its opponent, targeting voters that are more ideologically disposed toward its op-
ponent? And, how do the answers to these questions depend on parties’ expectations of how
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voters attitudes might change over the course of the campaign, the strength of pre-existing party
loyalty, and the relative marginal value that a party derives from winning additional seats below,
at, or even above the majority threshold?
A small initial imbalance does not deter a disadvantaged party from the sole pursuit of out-
right victory by way of a centrist policy agenda. However, a sufficiently large imbalance induces it
to revert in favor of a strategy that consolidates its core supporters, in order to avoid a catastrophic
defeat. Similarly, an advantaged party initially prefers to maintain uncontested control of the po-
litical centre to further fortify its prospects of a post-election majority. But, if the imbalance is large
enough, it chases its opponent to plunder its increasingly ill-served moderate supporters; the ad-
vantaged party’s goal evolves from seeking to win, to winning with a larger post-election majority.
Our framework generates novel predictions about the consequences of initial electoral imbal-
ances for platform choices and polarization. In particular, we predict that a very advantaged
party uses its strength as an opportunity to expand the frontier of its political support beyond
the median voter; as illustrated by the campaigns of Tony Blair and Theresa May. This contrasts
with Groseclose (2001), who predicts that a very advantaged party instead uses its advantage to
revert toward its own base. This logic also implies that polarization between parties is maximized
not when the imbalance between parties is very large, but instead when it is intermediate—small
enough that the stronger party maintains rather than attempting to expand its support, but large
enough that the weak party reverts toward a more defensive strategy. We also find that polar-
ization is greatest not when party loyalties are strong, but rather when they are weak so that core
supporters cannot be taken for granted.
In ongoing work, we use our framework to study the dynamics of political campaigns in con-
texts where some voters cast ballots early, or make up their minds before a campaign concludes.
To wit, we assume that some voters cast their ballots after an initial valence shock that favors one
of the parties, but before the parties have communicated their policy commitments, and prior to
any other developments—such as leader debates, town hall meetings, or personal revelations—
that occur over the course of a campaign. We interpret these voters as ‘early deciders’, who are
relatively insensitive or inattentive to the twists and turns of election campaigns.
If the initial valence shock favoring one of the parties is small, the parties converge on a plat-
form that—rather than targeting the median voter in the median district, as in Proposition 1—
moves toward the advantaged party’s core districts, by an increment that grows with both the
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magnitude of the initial valence shock and the fraction of early deciders. To see why, notice that
the advantaged party enjoys a larger share of support amongst early deciders, and thus gains a
starting lead in the polls. In order to win the election, the disadvantaged party therefore needs
to offset its disadvantage by carrying strictly more than a majority of supporters amongst the
remaining voters. This leads it to move beyond the ideological centre-ground, targeting voters
that are ideologically disposed toward its advantaged opponent. Thus, the disadvantaged party
designs its policy to appeal to its rival’s voters even though ideology is not the source of its disad-
vantage.
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5. Appendix: Proofs of Results
Let xi∗(ρ0 + ρ1, zL, zR) denote the preferred policy of the (“marginal”) voter who is indifferent
between parties L and R given the realized net valence advantage to party R of ρ0 + ρ1 and the
platform choices zL and zR. Given θ > 2γ, for any pair (zL, zR), a voter j with ideal policy xj > xi∗
strictly prefers party R, and a voter j with ideal policy xj < xi∗ strictly prefers party L. Party L
therefore wins a district with median m if and only if xi∗(ρ0 + ρ1, zL, zR) ≥ m. Aggregating over
districts, party L’s seat share is:
1 + xi
∗
2
, (13)
and party L therefore wins the election if and only if xi∗(ρ0 + ρ1, zL, zR) ≥ 0.
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3 . We first rule out the existence of an equilibrium in which the plat-
form profile (zL, zR) fails to satisfy zL ≤ zR ≤ 0. For this, we will rule out pure strategy equilibria
in which (1) zL ≤ 0 < zR, (2) 0 ≤ zL ≤ zR with at least one strict inequality, (3) zR ≤ 0 ≤ zL with at
least one strict inequality, (4) zR < zL ≤ 0, and (5) 0 ≤ zR < zL.
Profile 1: zL ≤ 0 < zR. There are 3 possible locations for the marginal voter:
1. Location 1: xi∗ ≥ zR, i.e. γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1 − θzL ≤ 0, i.e. ρ1 ≤ γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − θzR:
x∗ =
γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≡ x1∗.
2.Location 2: zL ≤ xi∗ ≤ zR, i.e. γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − θzR ≤ ρ1 ≤ γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − θzL:
x∗ =
γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2γ + θ
≡ x2∗.
3. Location 3: xi∗ ≤ zL, i.e. ρ1 ≥ γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − θzL:
x∗ =
γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≡ x3∗.
Party R wins if and only if x2∗ ≤ 0, i.e.,
ρ1 > γ(zL + zR)− ρ0. (14)
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Party R’s expected payoff is therefore:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
−ψ
(
α
2
− αγ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
)
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL+xR)−ρ0
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
− αγ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(2γ + θ)
)
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL+xR)−ρ0
(
r − βγ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(2γ + θ)
)
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
(
r − βγ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
)
dρ1.
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. Solving the first-order
condition yields:
zˆintR (zL, ρ0) =
−α(θ − ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr + γzL(β − α)
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) , (15)
which increases in zL. Setting zL = 0, we find that
zˆintR (zL) =
−α(θ − ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) ,
which is strictly negative for all ρ0 ≥ 0, under Assumption 1. This contradicts the supposition
that zR > 0 is a best response.
Profile 2: 0 ≤ zL ≤ zR, with at least one strict inequality. Under this profile, party R wins if and only
if x3∗ ≤ 0, which happens if and only if ρ1 ≥ γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 where the marginal voter is given as
in Profile 1. Party R’s expected payoff is therefore:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
−ψ
(
α
2
− αγ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
)
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
− αγ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(2γ + θ)
)
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
(
α
2
− αγ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
)
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
(
r − βγ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
)
dρ1. (16)
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Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. This objective admits a
(unique) interior solution, zˆR(zL; ρ0), satisfying:
zˆR(zL; ρ0) =
(α + β)ρ0 − (α− β)(ψ + γzL) + θ(2r − α)
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) . (17)
This implies that zˆR(zL; ρ0)− zL strictly decreases in zL and in ρ0. It is easy to verify that zˆR(0; 0)−
zL < 0, contradicting the supposition zR > zL. The supposition 0 ≤ zL ≤ zR with at least one strict
inequality then implies 0 < zL = zR. Consider, therefore, party R’s expected payoff from a choice
of zR ∈ [0, zL]:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
−ψ
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
α
2
− α
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
(
r − β
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (18)
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave. Solving the first-order condition
yields:
zˆintR =
−α(θ − ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr + γzL(β − α)
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) ,
which satisfies zˆintR < zL, contradicting the supposition that 0 < zR = zL is an equilibrium profile.
Profile 3: zR ≤ 0 < zL. There are three possible locations for the marginal voter:
Location 1: xi∗ ≤ zR, i.e., γ(zR− zL)− γ(zR− zR)− ρ0− ρ1− θzR ≤ 0, i.e., ρ1 ≥ γ(zR− zL)− ρ0− θzR:
γ(x∗ − zL)− γ(x∗ − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1 − θx∗ = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗ = γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≡ x1∗. (19)
Location 2: xi∗ ∈ (zR, zL), i.e., γ(zR − zL)− γ(zR − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1 − θzR > 0 and γ(zL − zL)− γ(zR −
zL)− ρ0 − ρ1 − θzL < 0, i.e., γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − θzR > ρ1 > γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − θzL. This implies:
γ(x∗ − zL)− γ(zR − x∗)− θx∗ − ρ0 − ρ1 = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗ = −γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ − 2γ ≡ x2
∗. (20)
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Location 3: xi∗ ≥ zL, i.e., γ(zL− zL)− γ(zR− zL)− ρ0− ρ1− θzL > 0, i.e., ρ1 < γ(zL− zR)− ρ0− θzL.
This implies:
γ(zL − x∗)− γ(zR − x∗)− θx∗ − ρ0 − ρ1 = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗ = γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≡ x3∗. (21)
Party R wins if and only if x2∗ ≤ 0, i.e.,
ρ1 ≥ −γ(zL + zR)− ρ0.
Party R’s expected payoff from zR ≤ 0 is therefore:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
−ψ
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ −γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
α
2
− α
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
−γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
(
r − β
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
r − β
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (22)
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. Solving the first-order
condition yields:
zˆintR (zL) =
−α(θ + ρ0 − ψ)− β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr + γzL(α− β)
αγ − βγ + 2βθ .
Similarly, party L’s expected payoff from zL ≥ 0 is:
piL(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
−ψ
(
r + β
(
γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ −γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
r + β
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
−γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
(
α
2
+ α
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (23)
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Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zL. Solving the first-order
condition yields:
zˆintL (zR) =
α(θ − ρ0 − ψ) + β(ψ − ρ0)− 2θr + γzR(α− β)
αγ − βγ + 2βθ .
Solving these interior best responses, we obtain a pair (z∗L, z
∗
R) satisfying, under Assumption 1:
z∗R − z∗L =
−αθ + αψ − βψ + 2θr
αγ − βγ + βθ > 0.
Thus, there does not exist an equilibrium in which zR < 0 < zL.
Suppose, instead, zR = 0 < zL. Since zˆintL (zR) strictly decreases in ρ0 for all zR, we may set
ρ0 = 0 and obtain:
zˆintL (0) =
α(θ − ψ) + βψ − 2θr
αγ − βγ + 2βθ < 0,
which contradicts zL > 0.
Profile 4: zR < zL ≤ 0. The three possible locations of the marginal voter are given in expressions
(19) through (21). In contrast with Profile 3, however, Party R wins under this profile if and only
if x3∗ ≤ 0, i.e.,
ρ1 ≥ γ(zL − zR)− ρ0.
Party R’s expected payoff is:
piL(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
−ψ
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
(
r − β
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
r − β
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
r − β
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (24)
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. Solving the first-order condi-
tion yields:
zˆintR (zL) =
−α(θ + ρ0 − ψ)− β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr + γzL(α− β)
αγ − βγ + 2βθ .
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Similarly, party L’s expected payoff is:
piL(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
−ψ
(
r + β
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
α
2
+ α
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (25)
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zL. Solving the first-order condi-
tion yields:
zˆintL (zR) =
α(θ + ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 − ψ)− 2θr + γzR(β − α)
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) .
Suppose, first, that zR < zL < 0. Solving the interior best responses simultaneously yields a pair
(z∗L, z
∗
R) satisfying:
z∗L − z∗R =
(α− β)(α(θ + ρ0 − ψ) + β(ρ0 − ψ)− 2θr)
α2γ + 2αβθ − β2γ ,
which strictly increases in ρ0. Straightforward algebra establishes:
z∗L − z∗R ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ρ0 ≥ ψ +
θ(2r − α)
α + β
, (26)
which violates our assumption that ρ0 ∈ [−ψ, ψ]. Suppose, instead, that zR < zL = 0. We find that
zintR (0) strictly decreases in ρ0, and moreover that:
zintR (0) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ ρ0 ≥
−αθ + αψ − βψ + 2θr
α + β
≡ ρˆ0. (27)
Straightforward algebra reveals that
α ≥ β ⇒ ∂piL(zL, zR)
∂zL
∣∣∣∣
zL=0,zR=zˆR(0),ρ0=ρˆ0
< 0, (28)
which implies that a deviation by party L to a platform z′L < 0 is profitable.
Profile 5: 0 < zR < zL. The three possible locations of the marginal voter x∗ are given in expres-
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sions (19) through (21). In contrast with Profiles 3 and 4, however, Party R wins under this profile
if and only if x1∗ ≤ 0, i.e.,
ρ1 ≥ γ(zR − zL)− ρ0.
Party R’s expected payoff is:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
−ψ
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
α
2
− α
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
− α
(
γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
(
r − β
(
γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
))
dρ1. (29)
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. Solving the first-order condi-
tion yields:
zˆintR (zL) =
(2r − α)θ − zL(α− β)γ + ρ0(α + β)− (α− β)ψ
−((α− β)γ + 2αθ) .
Similarly, party L’s expected payoff is:
piL(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
−ψ
(
r + β
(
γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
r + β
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
r + β
(
γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (30)
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. Solving the first-order
condition yields:
zˆintL (zR) =
(2r − α)θ − zR(α− β)γ + ρ0(α + β)− (α− β)ψ
−((α− β)γ + 2βθ) .
Solving the interior best responses, simultaneously, yields a pair (z∗L, z
∗
R) which, under Assump-
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tion 1, satisfy:
z∗L − z∗R = −
(α− β)(α(ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 + ψ) + θ(2r − α))
α2γ + 2αβθ − β2γ < 0,
which contradicts zR < zL. 
Existence of equilibrium. We now verify that there exists an equilibrium in which zL ≤ zR ≤ 0,
and moreover that it is unique under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3.
There are 3 possible locations for the marginal voter.
Location 1: xi∗ ≥ zR, i.e. ρ1 ≤ γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − θzR:
x∗ =
γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
= x3
∗. (31)
Location 2: zL ≤ xi∗ ≤ zR, i.e. γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − θzR ≤ ρ1 ≤ γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − θzL:
x∗ =
γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2γ + θ
= x2
∗. (32)
Location 3: xi∗ ≤ zL, i.e. ρ1 ≥ γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − θzL:
x∗ =
γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≡ x1∗. (33)
Party R wins if and only if x3∗ ≤ 0, i.e.,
ρ1 ≥ γ(zL − zR)− ρ0.
Party R’s expected payoff from zR ∈ [zL, 0] is therefore:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
−ψ
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
(
r − β
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
(
r − β
(
γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(2γ + θ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
(
r − β
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (34)
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Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. Solving the first-order condi-
tion yields:
zˆintR (zL) =
−α(θ + ρ0 − ψ)− β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr + γzL(α− β)
αγ − βγ + 2βθ . (35)
Similarly, party L’s expected payoff from zL ≤ zR is:
piL(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
−ψ
(
r + β
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
+ α
(
γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(2γ + θ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (36)
Under Assumption 1, this expected payoff is strictly concave in zL. Solving the first-order condi-
tion yields:
zˆintL (zR) =
α(θ + ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 − ψ)− 2θr + γzR(β − α)
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) . (37)
Let (z∗L, z
∗
R) denote a pair that satisfies z
∗
L ≤ z∗R ≤ 0 and that solves the system of best responses
(35) and (37).
First, we identify conditions for z∗L = z
∗
R = 0. We observe that zˆ
int
L (0) strictly decreases in ρ0, and
also that zˆintR (0) strictly decreases in ρ0. We find that:
zˆintL (0) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ρ0 ≤
−ψ(α− β)− αθ + 2θr
α + β
≡ ρ
0
(38)
and
zˆintR (0) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ρ0 ≤
ψ(α− β)− αθ + 2θr
α + β
= ρ′0, (39)
where Assumption 1 that α ≥ β implies that ρ′0 ≥ ρ0. Thus, z∗L = z∗R = 0 if ρ0 ≤ ρ0.
Second, we identify conditions for z∗L < z
∗
R = 0. In that case, we have
z∗L = zˆ
int
L (0) =
α(θ + ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 − ψ)− 2θr
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) , (40)
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and further require that zˆintR (zˆ
int
L (0)) ≥ 0. Tedious but straightforward algebra establishes that
zˆintL (0) < 0 ⇐⇒ ρ0 > ρ0, (41)
and
zˆintR (zˆ
int
L (0)) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ρ0 ≤
θ
(
α
(
ψ(α−β)
α(γ+θ)−βγ − 1
)
+ 2r
)
α + β
≡ ρ0. (42)
Therefore, z∗L < z
∗
R = 0 if ρ ∈ (ρ0, ρ0].
Third, we identify conditions for z∗L < z
∗
R < 0. In that case, we may solve the system of interior
solutions, directly, to obtain:
z∗L =
βθψ(β − α)− (αγ + β(θ − γ))(α(θ + ρ0) + βρ0 − 2θr)
θ (α2γ + 2αβθ − β2γ) ,
z∗R = z
∗
L +
(α− β)(−α(θ + ρ0 − ψ) + β(ψ − ρ0) + 2θr)
α2γ + 2αβθ − β2γ , (43)
where it is easily verified that indeed z∗L < z
∗
R < 0 for all ρ0 > ρ0.
We now verify that for all ρ0 ≥ 0, the solution (z∗L, z∗R) is an equilibrium. To establish this, it is
necessary and sufficient to verify that there are no profitable deviations for party L to an alterna-
tive platform zL > z∗R, and no profitable deviations for partyR to an alternative platform zR < z
∗
L.
No profitable deviation by party L to z′L > z∗R. Consider a deviation by party L to a platform
z′L ∈ (z∗R, 0]. This implies ρ0 > ρ0. For any pair (zL, zR) satisfying zR < zL, there are three possible
locations for the marginal voter.
Location 1: xi∗ ≤ zR, i.e., ρ1 ≥ γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − θzR.
γ(x∗ − zL)− γ(x∗ − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1 − θx∗ = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗ = γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≡ x1∗. (44)
Location 2: xi∗ ∈ (zR, zL), i.e., γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − θzR > ρ1 > γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − θzL. This implies:
γ(x∗ − zL)− γ(zR − x∗)− θx∗ − ρ0 − ρ1 = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗ = −γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ − 2γ ≡ x2
∗. (45)
Location 3: xi∗ ≥ zL, i.e., ρ1 < γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − θzL. This implies:
γ(zL − x∗)− γ(zR − x∗)− θx∗ − ρ0 − ρ1 = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗ = γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
θ
≡ x3∗. (46)
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If party L locates at a platform zL ∈ (z∗R, 0], it wins if and only if x3∗ ≥ 0, which occurs if and only
if ρ1 < γ(zL − z∗R)− ρ0. Party L’s expected payoff from this deviation is then:
piL(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
−ψ
(
r + β
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
α
2
+ α
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (47)
Under Assumption 1, party L’s expected payoff is strictly concave in zL. This yields a first-order
condition that is equivalent to the first-order condition identified in expression (37), which is
therefore strictly negative evaluated at any zL > z∗R when ρ0 > ρ0.
Consider, instead, a deviation by party L to zL > 0. The possible locations of the marginal
voter are given in expressions (44) through (46). Moreover, party L wins if and only if x2∗ ≥ 0.
Party L’s expected payoff from zL ≥ 0 is:
piL(zL, z
∗
R) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
−ψ
(
r + β
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ −γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
r + β
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
)dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
−γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
(
α
2
+ α
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
+ α
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (48)
Under Assumption 1, party L’s expected payoff is strictly concave in zL. Solving the first-order
condition yields:
x′L(zR) =
αθ − αρ0 − αψ − βρ0 + βψ − 2θr + γzR(α− β)
αγ − βγ + 2βθ , (49)
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which strictly increases in zR. Recalling that z∗R ≤ 0, straightforward algebra yields:
x′L(0) = −
α(−θ + ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 − ψ) + 2θr
αγ − βγ + 2βθ < 0,
which establishes that a deviation by party L to x′L > 0 is not profitable, for any z
∗
R ≤ 0.
No profitable deviation by partyR to z′R > 0 or z′R < z∗L. Consider a deviation by partyR to a platform
zR < zL. The locations of the marginal voter are given in expressions (44) through (46). In this
case, party R wins if and only if x3∗ ≤ 0. Party R’s expected payoff is:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
−ψ
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0
(
r − β
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzL
(
r − β
(−γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(θ − 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzR
(
r − β
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (50)
Under Assumption 1, party R’s expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. This yields a first-order
condition that is equivalent to the first-order condition identified in expression (35), and which
therefore implies that a deviation z′R < z
∗
L cannot be profitable.
Consider, instead, a deviation by party R to a platform zR > 0. The locations of the marginal
voter are given in expressions (31) through (33). In this case, party R wins if and only if x2∗ ≤ 0.
Party R’s expected payoff is:
piR(zL, zR) =
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
−ψ
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL − zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
γ(zL−zR)−ρ0−θzR
(
α
2
− α
(
(γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2(θ + 2γ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
γ(zL+zR)−ρ0
(
r − β
(
γ(zL + zR)− ρ0 − ρ1
2(2γ + θ)
))
dρ1
+
1
2ψ
∫ ψ
γ(zR−zL)−ρ0−θzL
(
r − β
(
(γ(zR − zL)− ρ0 − ρ1)
2θ
))
dρ1. (51)
Under Assumption 1, party R’s expected payoff is strictly concave in zR. Solving the first-order
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condition yields:
zˆ′R(zL) =
−α(θ − ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr + γzL(β − α)
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) , (52)
which strictly increases in zL ≤ 0. Straightforward algebra establishes:
zˆ′R(0) =
−α(θ − ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 + ψ) + 2θr
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) < 0, (53)
which establishes that a deviation to zR > 0 is not profitable. 
Proof of Corollary 1. In this case, we have z∗R(ρ0) = 0, so that
z∗L(ρ0) =
α(θ + ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 − ψ)− 2θr
βγ − α(γ + 2θ) . (54)
We obtain comparative statics for each of the primitives, in turn.
Higher ρ0. We have
∂z∗L
ρ0
= α+β
βγ−α(γ+2θ) < 0. Thus, z
∗
L decreases in ρ0.
Higher θ. We have
∂z∗L
∂θ
=
α(−αγ + 2α(ρ0 + ψ) + β(γ + 2ρ0 − 2ψ)) + 2γr(α− β)
(βγ − α(γ + 2θ))2 . (55)
The numerator of this expression strictly increases in ρ0, and is therefore positive if and only
if ρ0 ≥ (α−β)(α(γ−2ψ)−2γr)2α(α+β) . This threshold is strictly negative (and thus vacuously satisfied) if
r > α
2
− αψ
γ
, which holds. We conclude that z∗L increases in θ.
Higher α. We have
∂z∗L
∂α
=
βγ(θ + 2ρ0) + 2βθ(ρ0 − ψ)− 2θr(γ + 2θ)
(βγ − α(γ + 2θ))2 . (56)
Calling ν(ρ0) the numerator of this expression, we find that ν(ρ0) strictly increases in ρ0, and that
ν(ρ0) < 0. Thus, z∗L strictly decreases in α.
Higher γ. We have
∂z∗L
∂γ
=
(α− β)(α(θ + ρ0 + ψ) + β(ρ0 − ψ)− 2θr)
(βγ − α(γ + 2θ))2 . (57)
The numerator of this expression strictly increases in ρ0, and is weakly positive evaluated at
ρ0 = ρ0. Therefore, z
∗
L strictly increases in γ.
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Higher ψ. ∂z
∗
L
∂ψ
= β−α
α(γ+2θ)−βγ < 0.
Higher r. We have ∂z
∗
L
∂r
= − 2θ
βγ−α(γ+2θ) > 0.
Proof of Corollaries 2, 3 and 4 and 5.
z∗L(ρ0) =
βθψ(β − α)− (αγ + β(θ − γ))(α(θ + ρ0) + βρ0 − 2θr)
θ (α2γ + 2αβθ − β2γ) .
z∗R(ρ0) = z
∗
L(ρ0) +
(α− β)((α + β)(ψ − ρ0) + θ(2r − α))
α2γ + 2αβθ − β2γ . (58)
We obtain comparative statics for each of the primitives, in turn.
Higher ρ0. We find that
∂z∗L
∂ρ0
= β(α−β)
α2γ+2αβθ−β2γ − 1θ , which is strictly negative if and only if θ > βγ−αγβ ,
which holds. Moreover, ∂[z
∗
L−z∗R]
∂ρ0
= β
2−α2
α2γ+2αβθ−β2γ < 0, which implies that z
∗
R also decreases in ρ0,
and faster than z∗L. 
Higher α. We start with the platform z∗L. We find that
∂z∗L
∂α
can be written as a quotient with a
strictly positive denominator, and a numerator that we call ν(r, ψ), which strictly decreases in r.
Assumption 1, r > 1
2
(
α + ψ
θ
(α− β))), yields:
∂ν(r, ψ)
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
r= 1
2(α+
ψ
θ
(α−β)))
= −2αβ2θ − γ
2(α− β)3
θ
− βγ(α− β)2 < 0. (59)
Since ψ > ρ0, it is then sufficient to observe that:
ν
(
1
2
(
α +
ψ
θ
(α− β))
)
, ρ0
)
=− (α2γ + 2αβθ − β2γ) (αγ + β(θ − γ))
− ρ0(α− β) (γ
2(α− β)2 + 2βγθ(α− β) + 2β2θ2)
θ
, (60)
which is strictly negative under Assumptions 1 and 2. Thus, ∂z
∗
L
∂α
< 0.
We next consider the platform z∗R. We find that
∂z∗R
∂α
can be written as a quotient with a strictly
positive denominator, and a numerator that we call µ(ρ0, ψ), which strictly decreases in ρ0, and
that there exists ρˆ0 such that µ(ρ0, ψ) ≥ 0 if and only if ρ0 ≤ ρˆ0. Thus, ρ > ρˆ0 implies that z∗R
decreases in α, while ρ > ρˆ0 implies that z∗R increases in α, and that ρˆ0 strictly decreases in α. It is
straightforward to verify that there are parameter configurations for which ρˆ0 > ρ0.
Higher r. ∂z
∗
L
∂r
= 2(αγ+β(θ−γ))
α2γ+2αβθ−β2γ > 0, and
∂z∗R
∂r
= 2α(γ+θ)−2βγ
α2γ+2αβθ−β2γ > 0, and
∂[z∗L−z∗R]
∂r
= 2θ(α−β)
α2γ+2αβθ−β2γ > 0.
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Higher ψ. ∂z
∗
L
∂ψ
= β(β−α)
α2γ+2αβθ−β2γ < 0, and
∂z∗R
∂ψ
= α(α−β)
α2γ+2αβθ−β2γ > 0.
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